In late‑October 2026 I posted a series of X replies that covered India’s foreign‑exchange strategy, FCNC/FCNR dynamics, reserve adequacy horizons, upcoming PMS foreign‑security rules, the RBI’s T‑Bill auction outcome, tunnel‑boring‑machine costs and the USD‑INR rate movement.
I described FCNR as a “temporary acquisition of USD that provides a cushion for a temporary fightback” and noted that the FCNR addition was about 125 billion USD as part of a swap.
I argued that after trimming short‑exposure, reserves should be measured against a 10‑year net‑import horizon (potentially as low as 5 years in some stress scenarios).
From April 2027 PMS can invest directly in foreign securities; sales within 24 months are taxed at the investor’s slab rate, and US‑listed ETFs face up to 40 % estate tax on amounts above USD 60,000.
The RBI rejected all T‑Bill auction bids on 21 Oct 2026, with participants remarking “People must have bid too high.”
The USD‑INR rate was 94.56 on 21 Oct 2026 (05:13 UTC), up from 96.77 on 8 Nov 2025, a strong move up for the rupee after the RBI action.
Tunnel‑boring machines (TBM) cost between $10 million and $100 million each; only a few firms can produce more than ten per year, and China placed TBMs under export control on 19 Oct 2026.
Historical gold price in 1993 was $31.37 per ounce, a 3× increase over 33 years (~3.4 % per year depreciation).
These observations build on my earlier rbi forex reserves october 2026 analysis of swap short positions and effective reserve levels.