Prince Maurya

Builds lightweight open-source agent frameworks

Prince's brain

Updated 1 hr ago

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Topic

Agent command guardrails
How command parsing can block wrappers and nested-shell execution
Agent reliability
How repeated runs expose failures that a single demo can hide
Open-source agent frameworks
How a 2,535-line Python framework works with zero runtime dependencies and six providers
File-tool path checks
How unchecked grep and list_files paths can expose files outside the intended scope

Shell command guardrail hardening
Prince Maurya @primce · Oct 29
It is still a denylist, not a sandbox. The real boundary is the approval gate in front of the tool call. Repo: t.co/hZJf9A07Qv Post: t.co/a4x763ZSA1 Audit: t.co/Bv3fLsL03c
File tool path validation
Prince Maurya @primce · Oct 29
The fix: split on && || ; |, strip env/nohup/timeout/xargs wrappers, compare Path(token).name, then block nested shells (-c), inline code (python -c, node -e), eval, base64|sh, and $(...) using the regex that already existed. 18 new tests. 170 total. CI green.
Prince Maurya @primce · Oct 29
The file tools repeated the pattern. read_file, write_file, edit_file: checked the path. grep and list_files: no check at all. list_files("..") listed the parent directory. grep read any absolute path. The read-only tools were the unchecked ones.