Decision: I will not market the product as an “anti‑AI” play because that framing would divert responsibility (“blame”) away from other factors.
Tax communication: I clarified that investing in the USA does not trigger U.S. tax liability for the investor; tax must be paid in India, similar to the treatment of Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs).
Casual interaction: I replied to @SanaSecurities with the line “Because i also look like one. 😀”.
I am only objecting to calling India and anti AI trade.
Please stop this Gurmeet. Do not position India as an "anti tech, anti progress, anti innovation in the world" trade.
AI is not stopping whether the stocks related with AI do well or not.
India’s market is underperforming, but the cause is multi‑factor: taxes, domestic liquidity, and currency dynamics all play roles.
A 1 % annual strengthening of the INR saves over US $2 billion per year on oil imports, equating to roughly $2 billion in annual savings.
The implied average cost of borrowing dollars over three years is about 1.5 % (5 % loan rate spread over the term).
FCNR swap hedging costs 2‑3 % per annum, which is justified by the > US $2 bn savings from INR appreciation.
I have been the only one discussing taxes for over five years.
On 18 Oct 2026 I replied in a X thread about the RBI’s gold holdings. I referenced a prior discussion with @MyWealthGuide, noting that the RBI cannot simply sell gold because “the Indian public wants it.” The tone was informal, with remarks like “Among other things 😀” and “It is called letting go of gold.”
On 17 Oct 2026 I replied in a X thread to correct a claim that the RBI was limiting “big dollar buyers”. I clarified that these buyers are not purchasing oil directly, so they do not carry oil‑price risk on their balance sheets.
The clarification was posted at 12:45 UTC on 2026‑10‑17.
I noted that the “big dollar buyers” are not purchasing oil directly and therefore do not bear oil‑price risk on their balance sheets.
@SaurabhGarg1975 acknowledged the reply with a 👍.
The acknowledgement (“👍”) was posted at 04:37 UTC on 2026‑10‑17.
In late October 2026 I discussed RBI’s proposal to overhaul Gold ETFs. The central bank plans to replace physical‑gold‑backed ETFs with schemes that issue tradable gold receipts, with the RBI importing and holding gold to meet redemption requests. Redemptions will be settled in Indian rupees rather than foreign currency, a move aimed at easing foreign‑exchange pressure while still delivering gold‑linked returns. Capital‑gains on the receipts are proposed to be taxed at the individual investor level, aligning them with other securities.
Urban Company IPO price was Rs 103.
The IPO issue size was ₹1,900 crore (₹472 crore fresh issue plus ₹1,428 crore Offer For Sale).
BAAP Fund Managers ramped the stock price up to Rs 165, creating a QIP opportunity.
Product velocity increased by 30‑40 % thanks to AI adoption.
In the October 2026 X thread I also warned against the phrase “patient capital,” arguing that returns themselves make capital patient.
In late October 2026 I participated in a thread on X about the looming outflow of patient capital from India as 7‑year private‑equity funds hit the end of their investment horizon. The discussion focused on tax policy—specifically a proposal to abolish Long‑Term Capital Gains (LTCG) tax for holdings of two years or more—to attract long‑term investors, and on the structural mismatch of foreign ETFs, which provide daily liquidity and therefore cannot realistically hold Indian equities for the proposed 2‑3 year horizon.
Proposed policy: Abolish LTCG tax for holdings ≥2 years to bring patient risk capital back to India.
Rationale: Removing LTCG tax (or making it nil) would “unleash investment animal spirits” and support India’s growth story.
Decision: Keep ETF tax treatment unchanged because daily‑liquidity ETFs cannot meet a 2‑3 year holding requirement and would still face high taxes on unit‑holder sales.
Observation: Reducing short‑term turnover could lower cash volumes, futures trading, and STT collections, impacting fiscal receipts.
In mid‑October 2026 I posted about the RBI’s foreign‑exchange reserve usage. The discussion centred on the $43 bn drawn from a $143 bn borrowing programme that was used to meet a liability, not lost as a pure expense.
The RBI has used $43 bn of the $143 bn borrowed under its guarantee to defend the rupee.
The FCNR liability due at the end of three years remains unchanged at $140 bn.
Broad money supply is now close to 90 % of GDP, echoing levels seen during the COVID era, and the RBI balance sheet has swollen as a result.
The best times are when we actually don’t feel like investing.
Unknowable path.
Downs and ups.
Reasonable returns if held for long.
Unreasonable returns when invest in bear mark.
In early October 2026 I also shared several observations on Indian fintech and corporate matters, ranging from a TVS family succession dispute to policy‑level thoughts on UPI market‑share caps, a tentative timeline for the Helios multi‑asset fund, and personal guidelines for when I choose to comment on topics.
Succession battle at TVS with Venu Srinivasan and son fighting with wife and daughter. TOI
NCPI (National Payments Council of India) has existing rules capping UPI market share per company to 30% by volume.
PhonePe (owned by Walmart) and Google Pay each have mkt share (much) more than 30% each
Reading in today's TOI about how UPI is now 10 yrs old.
@ransiyaki yes - some day next yr
I only comment when it is worth a full dollar. If it is worth only 2 cents why bother?
A friend once told me not to invest in a Mutual Fund unless it completes 1.5 years first. This one has completed ~4 years now.
A hunch (or a suspicion) that atleast part of the FII money is actually domestic money that has been rerouted back to India.
These points build on earlier discussions in x post september 2026, extending my view of Indian fintech dynamics and personal investment heuristics.
On 6 Oct 2026 I discussed RBI’s FX‑reserve mechanism, where commercial banks deposit dollars with the RBI, which issues rupee equivalents and holds the dollars for several years, creating a mark‑to‑market exposure on the FCNR portfolio.
Total FCNR deposits taken: $132.98 billion.
FCNR deposits were taken at INR rates ranging from Rs 94.61 to Rs 96.20 (avg around Rs 95.50).
The current USD/INR rate is Rs 96.42.
$132.98 billion × (Rs 96.42 – Rs 95.50) = Rs 122 billion = Rs 12,200 crores (unrealized loss).
RBI plans to hold the deposited dollars for about four years before returning them to banks, balancing reserve stability with eventual repayment.
Our group bought less than 0.75% of AUM in the Acevector IPO.
The student I advised had credentials: 43+ predicted, IEO Bronze, ICDS Debate Gold.
On 4 Oct 2026 I posted on X about my daughter’s investing approach and received several replies from the community. The discussion covered encouraging her to become an “astute investor”, a feature request for bulk fund purchases, a comparison of Fixed Deposits versus mutual‑fund upside, and a specific query about holding a concentrated ≈ 550 K SGD position in Pimco GIS INCOME FUND (SGD‑hedged) which is currently about 20 K down.
Portfolio size is around 550 K SGD.
Current loss on Pimco GIS INCOME FUND is 20 K SGD.
Helios fund returned about 17 % on lump‑sum contributions for my daughter.
Feature request: enable bulk purchase of 3 or more funds with a single OTP and one login.
FDs would have given similar returns in 2 years compounded.
The goal is to give my daughter “potential for upside without downside in a weak market”.
I aim to make her an astute investor & not just smart or lucky.
As a consultant, I would tell a company that already owns a GCC to "go to external service provider".
If a client is currently working with an external service provider, I would advise them to "have yr own GCC".
On October 1 2026 at 06:29 UTC I posted an observation on X noting that a flight was filled with "so many heroes" and was led by a captain. The tone was enthusiastic, reflecting a positive impression of the gathering.
Timestamp of the observation: 2026‑10‑01 06:29 UTC.