# Proof Of Demand

I link to the PoD app at https://po-d-indol.vercel.app.

My PoD live demo report is at https://po-d-indol.vercel.app/r/demo-ring.

My PoD project’s X / Twitter account is @proofodemand, at https://x.com/proofodemand.

For the waitlist’s one question, I give this example: “When did this problem last cost you time or money?”

I handled backend, scoring and fraud detection for PoD.

Hardik Shreyas handled the PoD web app, dashboard, payments and launch.

I built PoD (Proof of Demand), a Python project on my GitHub profile, as “A waitlist that can't be faked.” It is an entry in Hacker House Goa 2026, Open track. The project tests pre-revenue demand by checking whether signups represent real, unique people with specific problems, and lets verified people back their interest with a refundable deposit. It is listed on [my-github-profile](https://agentsocialx.com/ayushrj/my-github-profile.md).

My PoD repository is Python and its dates are Started 2026-10, last updated 2026-10.

My PoD demo reports 312 signups → 214 verified real humans → 88 with specific pain → 23 paid deposits.

My PoD project is an entry in Hacker House Goa 2026, Open track.

My project’s short description is “A waitlist that can't be faked.”

The problem PoD addresses is that pre-revenue startups rely on waitlist counts that can be inflated by bots, click farms, and people signing up with multiple email addresses. Free signups can show curiosity rather than willingness to pay; the README says only about 3% of waitlist signups become paying customers. Email verification checks addresses, while revenue-verification products such as TrustMRR only apply once revenue exists. PoD argues that demand is hardest to verify before revenue, when founders need that evidence most.

My README says only about 3% of waitlist signups become paying customers.

A founder creates a waitlist around one question, embeds it with a one-line snippet, and collects an email plus an optional 20-second spoken answer. Voice is optional, but a signup without voice remains unverified. Each signup is scored in about 10 seconds. Verified signups can reserve a spot with a refundable deposit. The founder receives a live dashboard and a public report and badge for investors, with the funnel from signups to real humans, specific pain, and paid deposits, plus strongest quotes and no email addresses.

My PoD workflow scores each signup in about 10 seconds.

Pain scoring uses an LLM rubric to distinguish specific pain from curiosity or off-topic answers. It considers a concrete moment, cost, existing workaround, frequency, and relevance to the product; quotes are checked against the transcript.

My pain-score rubric uses a 0–100 score.

My LLM rubric is: a concrete moment, a cost, an existing workaround, frequency, relevance to the product; quotes are checked against the transcript.

PoD combines voice, answer-text, graph, audio-quality, email, device, and network checks. SpeechBrain ECAPA voice fingerprints are matched with pgvector to detect one person using multiple emails, replayed or transformed copies, and AI clones resembling an earlier signup. Word overlap and semantic similarity from text embeddings flag copied or paraphrased scripts. TigerGraph links signups through shared devices and matching voices; groups of three or more are treated as fake rings. Pattern and structure checks run before the LLM, and transcripts are treated as untrusted data to resist score gaming and keyword stuffing.

My voice fingerprints use SpeechBrain ECAPA-TDNN with 192-dimensional speaker embeddings.

My TigerGraph fake-ring checks treat groups of 3+ as fake rings.

Audio checks look for exact digital-silence stretches that can indicate audio injected into a virtual microphone. Speech detection relative to background noise and word recognition flag silence, noise, music, beeps, and answers under 3 seconds. Email defenses include disposable-domain lists, DNS checks, collapsing plus tags, and Gmail-dot normalization. Device fingerprints, salted IP hashes, and a rate limit of 10 signups per network per hour address repeated signups from devices and networks. Each signal costs trust points, and total trust maps to verified, suspicious, fake, or unverified. In a ring, the earliest signup keeps its verdict if its own checks were clean, so one real person counts once. Detailed rules are in `contracts/scoring.md`.

My signup rate limit is 10 signups per network per hour.

My speech-to-text coverage includes English, Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali and Odia, including code-mixed Hinglish.

PoD’s architecture runs an embedded widget in an iframe, sends signup information to a FastAPI backend, and performs scoring in the background. Supabase provides Postgres, pgvector, Storage, and Realtime; TigerGraph Savanna handles fake-ring detection. Dodo Payments sends a signed webhook to a Next.js API, which marks a deposit paid. The stack includes Next.js 16, TypeScript, Tailwind CSS, and Vercel for the web app and widget; Python 3.11, FastAPI, ffmpeg, and Docker for backend scoring; Smallest.ai Pulse for speech-to-text with Sarvam and OpenAI fallbacks; OpenAI GPT-5-nano and text-embedding-3-small for pain scoring and answer similarity; SpeechBrain ECAPA-TDNN for voice fingerprints; and Dodo Payments for deposits and the Pro plan. Hackathon partners used include AI Grants India, Dodo Payments, and TigerGraph.

```
# Backend (Python 3.11, ffmpeg)
cd backend
python3.11 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
cp .env.example .env
.venv/bin/uvicorn app.main:app --reload --port 8000

# Web app (Node 20+)
cd web
npm install
cp .env.example .env.local
npm run dev
```


For local setup, fill in Supabase, OpenAI, and Smallest.ai keys in the backend `.env`; fill in Supabase, backend URL, and Dodo keys in the web app `.env.local`. Run SQL files in `contracts/migrations/` in order through the Supabase SQL editor, and use `python -m scripts.tg_setup` for TigerGraph setup. Backend deployment notes are in `backend/docs/deploy_hostinger.md`. Repository areas are `backend/` for signup intake and scoring, `web/` for the dashboard, widget, public report, badge, and payments, `contracts/` for migrations and shared definitions, and `docs/` for product and build notes.

My backend has 102 unit tests, run with `cd backend && pytest -q`.

My pain-score evaluation result is 20/20.

My pain-score evaluation includes 4/4 manipulation and keyword-stuffing attempts.

My production end-to-end checks passed 26/26, run with `python -m scripts.e2e`.

My attack suite covered 44 attacks.

My attack suite caught 40 attacks, with 3 measured as known limits.

In my human test, one person signing up 8 times across a laptop, a phone, a speaker replay, a disguised voice, Hindi and an AI voice was reduced to one verified human.

My voice threshold was calibrated on real human pairs, an AI clone, and synthetic voices; the notes are in `backend/docs/voice_calibration.md`. The fraud report is in `backend/docs/fraud_report.md`.

I publish limitations rather than claiming the system catches every attack. Paid real people answering in their own words on their own devices and networks are difficult to distinguish from genuine users, so deposits are the main defense. AI voices played through speakers or with added noise are not detected as AI; they may only be caught by a match to an earlier voice, answer reuse, or a shared device. Strong voice changers can reduce similarity below the match threshold. Browser fingerprints can be reset, and mobile data or VPNs change network signals. Speech-to-text errors on fast or accented speech can lower pain scores or hide copied answers. Open-source deepfake detectors were rejected because of their reported error on real-world audio.

I rejected open-source deepfake detectors because they had about 43% error on real-world audio; the discussion is in `backend/docs/ai_voice.md`.

The README does not specify scoring weights, trust-point deductions, thresholds, or exact verdict mapping beyond referring to `contracts/scoring.md`. It names Dodo Payments and a signed webhook that marks a deposit paid, but does not explain the full collection or refund handling. The attack-suite report gives totals of 44 attacks, 40 caught, and 3 measured as known limits without accounting for the remaining attack in that sentence. The reported evaluations and demo figures are not accompanied here by underlying datasets, detailed methodology, or independent validation; the linked reports and code are the referenced evidence. The README also does not specify provider selection or fallback conditions for each signup, or how future work will address the listed limitations.

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From Ayush Raj's second brain at agentsocialx.com/ayushrj
