I prioritize customer obsession over competitor obsession, and I see subscription revenue as a potential way to support ecommerce growth. These captured posts offer brief principles and reactions, but do not provide implementation details or supporting evidence.
On August 21, 2026, replying to @Seanfrank, I wrote, “True, retention game seems so OP when mastered,” and thanked them for the reminder. The capture does not include what the reminder was about or explain what I meant by the “retention game.”
On 2025-11-14, I wrote that making customers happy puts a business ahead of the competition by a lot; agencies are included. I did not explain how being ahead is measured or provide evidence.
On 2025-11-14, I also wrote that customer service is a really easy place to make someone happy because the bar is so low. I did not give examples of what good service looks like.
On 2025-12-08, I called customer service underrated and said it is a good way to increase LTV and reduce return rates, aka preserve profits. I gave no specific practices or measured results.
On 2026-04-14, I said I recommend Aftersell for confirmation-page offers at $0.30–0.50 per order, with relevant offers and nothing extra to spend. I argued that the confirmation page gets every buyer at peak trust and can generate margin without ad spend; I did not report personal implementation or results.
In the same post, I said most brands use the confirmation page only as a receipt, while some use it as valuable funnel real estate, and that the opportunity is still being overlooked. I also quoted @varunkundra’s claims that Rokt had paid out over $1 billion to brands and could add up to 10% more profit; those claims were @varunkundra’s, not mine.
I prioritize this principle: Customer obsession > competitor obsession.
I noted that 2 of the biggest winning categories in Ecom in the last couple years had “Great subscription potential,” though the captured post does not identify the categories or make clear what the phrase refers to.
I recommended subscription revenue as a way to scale a Shopify store at a 1 ROAS on Meta, calling subscriptions on Shopify “overpowered.” I did not provide implementation details or evidence for the claim.
I reacted emphatically to fashion LTV, writing that “Fashion LTV is nuts if you think about it damn.” The captured post gives no definition of LTV or specific figure.
On 2025-04-29, I wrote, “I like this idea a lot.” I said the unidentified linked idea solves multiple problems at once and has subscription potential, but I did not identify the idea or explain which problems it solves: https://t.co/SqTiWSazwb.
On 2025-05-06, I said that “subscriptions compound by month 2 and breakeven ROAS gets lower and lower.” I described this as “the game”; I also wrote, “Thats on the first month,” without clarifying what that referred to. I gave no calculation or supporting data.
I gave an illustrative subscription-economics example: brands can spend “$30K/day at a 1 roas; $60K/day in overall revenue; big margins.” I did not define the example’s assumptions or how “overall revenue” and margins are measured.
On 2025-10-28, I bet that paid verification on platforms like X and Instagram is “absolutely printing money.” I argued that billions of people who previously generated cash for platforms through ad impressions can now also become monthly subscribers; I did not provide revenue figures or evidence.
On 2025-11-13, I wrote that making customers happy puts a store ahead of 90% of ecom stores. I did not explain how being “ahead” is measured or provide evidence for the figure.
Related: ecommerce growth lessons, software is still ecommerce, mining social media for customer research